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This Paper shall examine the synchronization between the technology and law so that the fruits of technology which can 
be used as a standardized technology and patents (SEP) can be granted to the patent holders so that it becomes a win- win 
situation to the innovator of technology and society at large. It shall also examine the global issues in standard essential 
patents and how India has handled such issues by complying with FRAND terms. Since the body granting the SEP is called 
Standard Setting Organization , therefore the historical prospective of SEP along with the issues arising in SEP shall also be 
analyzed with emphasis on FRAND terms and the specific case studies of United states, Germany, Japan and China 
including India shall be analysed mainly on Patent hold up and royalty issues and suggest the remedial measures; taking 
lessons from other countries and suggest the way forward in the form of recommendation in order to handle the SEP 
challenges in India in a timely, cost effective manner; as this is also one of the key factor for ease of doing business in India 
and providing sufficient protection to the Patent holder and avoid any misuse. 
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The traditional Patent System is based on a statutory 
right to owner of the patent for a certain period of 
time to stop others from using, selling or working out 
his invention, and exploit it commercially and to 
disclose the invention and practice that invention and 
make it workable thus encourage scientific research 
and new technology, with a view to stimulate new 
inventions of commercial utility and to pass invention 
into public domain after the expiry of the fixed period 
of the monopoly. However, the Standard Essential 
Patents (SEPs) is a step forward, wherein SEPs 
are the patents which are essential to implement a 
specific industry standard. This means that in order 
to manufacture standard compliant product,  
manufacturers will have to use technologies that are 
covered under one or more SEPs say in the electronics 
industry, telecom as well as in the digitized world. 
These Standards are nothing but the technical 
requirements or specifications which seek to provide a 
common design for a product or process, thereby 
reducing the cost of product to the end user. Patents 
which are essential to a standard and have been 
adopted by a Standard Setting Organization (SSO) are 
known as SEPs. The Indian Patents Act, 1970 does 
not contain any specific provision for SEPs nor does it 
mention any specific criteria or terms and conditions 
to be complied while licensing a patented technology. 
In the present era, where the technology is growing 
exponentially, there is an urgent need of legal system 
to synchronize with technology and to safeguard the 
rights of the developer and implement the technology 
for the betterment of society. 
In the area of telecom, last two decades have seen a 
sea change in technological development; making the 
society closer and ensuring e-business becomes a 
successful tool. One of the issue which is of key 
concern is the conflicts between mobile handset 
operators and their design providers, and therefore, it 
comes to our mind whether the existing law on SEP 
is sufficient to provide suitable remedies to the 
aggrieved party or there is a need to develop and 
formulate the law or the guideline(s) to deal with the 
issues pertaining to the specific type of SEP for 
multiple end users, objectively and in a transparent 
manner. An attempt has been made to examine the 
issues and challenges in the SEPs, mainly in the 
telecom sector in India along with the role of SSO and 
inter-operability between the SEP’s along with the 
judicial precedents, recommendations of national and 
international bodies to suggest the way forward for 
handling them with a logical solution. The issues in 
SEP came in limelight during 2010 and the steps 
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taken to resolve issues by United States, European 
Union, Germany, Japan and India has been discussed 
in the subsequent sections.2 Therefore, it is essential 
to understand the concept of SEP and its usage by all 
with a specific emphasis on the patentee to exploit the 
market by taking into account the legal provisions and 
the judicial precedents on the subject; while closely 
examining the Indian Law on the subject.  
 
Standard Essential Patent 
The term ‘SEP’ is different from a common patent 
by two terms, i.e., ‘Standard’ and ‘Essential’. The 
word ‘Standard’3 denotes uniformity as it refers to the 
certain specification which aims to provide a common 
design for either a product or process. The other key 
word, ‘Essential’ as defined by ETSI;4 refers to the 
essentials, which when applied to IPR formulate that 
it is impossible to take into account the normal 
technical practice or state of the art generally 
available at the time of standardization for 
manufacturing, sale, lease, otherwise dispose of, 
repair, use or operate equipment or methods which 
comply with a ‘Standard’ without infringing IPR.5 
Once the SEP is approved by an SSO, the patentee 
grants a limited window or rights on Fair Reasonable 
and Nondiscriminatory terms (FRAND) which are to 
be to be complied by the manufacturer. Therefore, it 
is duty of the SSO to formulate standards to ensure 
that the technology serves a meaningful and beneficial 
purpose to the society at large.  
Basically, the aim of SEP is to prevent 
monopolization of patentee and to enhance benefits to 
the customer. It has been observed that granting 
exclusive rights to patentee may defeat the basic 
purpose of granting SEP. Therefore, in order to strike 
a balance between the patentee and the 
manufacturer(s) rights, it is the duty of SSO to ensure 
that the patentee must grant license on FRAND and 
assist the manufacturer to negotiate with patient 
holder so that the patent holder gets the reward for his 
research, development including investment and the 
consumer to get the standardized technologies at 
lower cost, leading to a win-win situation. 
 
SSO: Historical Perspective 
Telecommunication across the globe was governed 
by the International Telegraph Union (ITU) in 1865 
whose purpose was to standardize telegraph networks. 
However, ITU was re-organized taking into account 
the advancement in technology in 1993 and the ITU-T 
became the body responsible for Standardization of 
Telecom Sector. Therefore, SSO falls under ITU; and 
are responsible to work under ITU-T.6 
 
Role of SSO 
A question which need to be tested where a license 
on FRAND basis has been granted; Can an injunction 
be sought later on mainly on grounds (1) where the 
patent holder charge an exorbitant royalty, adversely 
impacting the process of implementation of standard; 
or (2) the manufacturer after paying the royalty, 
violates and impacts the FRAND commitments and 
makes certain amendments affecting the economic 
interest of the patentee? To answer these, it is 
suggested that the grant of injunction should not be 
treated as a rule by the adjudicating authority; 
however, it can take cognizance of the FRAND 
commitment, public interest and the claim of patentee 
before granting injunction in a specific case.  
It is also the duty of SSO to ensure that the cases 
which are pending in foreign jurisdiction pertaining to 
injunction against manufacturer should not be 
permitted to enter into domestic jurisdiction for which 
a global law or guidelines on the subject is 
mandatory. In such situations, the most optimal 
solution is to formulate precise IPR policies wherein 
SSO members agree and commit to themselves that 
the grant of license on their SEPs is based on 
FRAND. Therefore, it is essential to examine the 
framework of SSO, its relevance and contribution 
towards growth and development of SEP in India.7 
 
Establishment of SSO and its Relevance in India 
The Telecommunications Standards Development 
Society, India (TSDSI) is the first SSO of India 
established in 2013 with an objective to maintain the 
inequalities existing between the patentee and 
licensee with the basic theme that any entity 
(manufacturer) can obtain license of its preferred 
technology on the basis of FRAND conditions. 
Therefore it is essential to examine the issues in SEP 
licensing.8 
 
Issues in SEP’s 
 
Basis of Licensing 
A patentee who has invented or developed a 
technology being the sole proprietor must be given 
due recognition, ownership and rights, which can be 
granted to third parties and in case of SEP’s; the 
benefits to the society are multifold and therefore the 
rights and interest of the licensor must be duly 
recognized, protected and rewarded based on FRAND 




terms and conditions. Keeping this in mind, it is 
expected that the parties to SEP shall act fairly in a 
transparent manner and follow the principle of 
fairness during negotiations, with a view to establish 
conditions based on which the license is granted in a 
specific case. However, care must be taken that the 
technology must be suitable and effective with 
reasonable license fee. It may be noted that there are 
no uniformly acceptable guidelines as to what 
constitutes the FRAND terms ; as it may differ from 
industry to industry and from one sector to another 
and it is time variant. It is for this reason the best 
approach seems to be that there should be sectorial 
discussions by stakeholders in order to establish 
common licensing practices including the evaluation 
of IP involved in terms of royalty.9 
In view of foregoing, it is essential that terms of the 
license should have a nexus with the economic value 
of the patented technology. It is possible that the 
technology may be used either only for development 
of standards and therefore as a first principle, the 
focus should be primarily on the technology itself and 
not the technology in standard. In cases where the 
technology is developed mainly for the standard and 
has little market value outside the standard, 
alternative evaluation methods, such as the relative 
importance of the technology in the standard 
compared to other contributions in the standard, 
which is a pertinent and relevant factor; should be 
taken into account . Therefore, while determining 
what constitutes FRAND, it must be considered based 
on the present value of the patented technology, 
irrespective of the success of the product in the 
market. The evaluator of FRAND should ensure that 
there is continues incentive for SEP holders to contribute 
their best available technology in developing the 
standards. Based on the applicability of standards and 
by using licensing platform and patent pools, the 
maximum cumulative rate can be finalized. 
 
Efficiency and Non-Discrimination 
The predominant factors to assess whether the 
terms of license are compatible with FRAND are:10 
a) The licensor should not discriminate between 
implementers who are 'similarly situated', however, it 
should be noted that licensor can treat differentially 
the implementer on the basis of industry to industry; 
based on the business models.  
b) Parties should conduct negotiations in good faith, 
taking into consideration the efficiency of technology 
during implementation of FRAND. 
c) The transaction cost should be kept as minimal as 
necessary during negotiation of a license. 
d) In cross-licensing, the efficiency gains pertaining 
to such practices should also be considered. 
e) It is quite possible that a national licensing 
approach may not be as efficient as universally 
recognized principles due to certain factors. 
Therefore, for SEP, FRAND terms should be 
standardized globally and in case of sector specific, 
necessary amends can be incorporated based on the 
experience gained and market requirement. 
 
FRAND Licensing Terms 
In any agreement, the parties are at best position to 
arrive at the terms of license including the royalty, to 
be agreed fairly during negotiations. It can be seen in 
the subsequent section(s) that the licensing rights have 
been hampered due to unclear and ambiguous terms 
as well as diverging interpretations and meaning of 
FRAND. It is due to this reason; the best technologies 
capable of industrial application are lying in court 
rooms thereby causing material harm to the society at 
large. This is also one of the root causes of delay. 
Therefore, it is essential to follow the principles 
discussed above, while evaluating whether, it is 
FRAND based licensing agreement or not. It is an 
appropriate time to adopt the above principles which 
could be taken as the bare minimum to address the 
FRAND concern and to create a conducive 
environment wherein the parties can negotiate the 
licensing terms to minimize litigation by taking into 
account the views of litigants, case studies as well as 
best equitable practices. 
 
Expertise on FRAND  
FRAND can be developed based on lessons learnt 
during execution of the license as well as amicable 
methods for settlement of disputes. In some cases, 
these means have been useful in clarifying, analyzing 
and valuing the technology. In order to determine a 
FRAND value, parties should consider the present 
value addition caused by SEP and also take into 
account the reasonable aggregate rate for the standard, 
however, care should be taken that the patent holders 
cannot discriminate between implementers who are 
‘similarly situated’.11 
From above, it can be interpreted that there is a 
need for compatibility between the SSO and SEP 
holders to develop effective solutions and facilitate 
the licensing process, pertaining to SEP including its 
implementation in the advanced technology environment, 




mainly for Small Scale Enterprises (SME) via patent 
pools or other licensing platforms, while offering 
sufficient transparency and predictability. It is therefore 
of utmost importance to monitor the licensing practices 
particularly in the IOT (Internet of things) and to set 
up an expert group to develop the best licensing 
practices along with sound IP evaluation on FRAND 
for the industrial application. 
 
Strategies during Negotiation  
An SEP user can fix the royalty amount in such a 
way so that it discourages the patent holder to back 
out from original commitment and provide opportunity 
to file injunction suit. Similarly, in assessing the quantum 
of damages for the breach of obligations, the best 
practices should be adopted based on expertise on 
FRAND. 
 
Dispute Resolution  
A dispute in SEPs arises when negotiations fails 
between the parties to a SEP License. Therefore, a 
balanced and predictable enforcement set up is 
required to have positive impact on the psyche of  
the parties during negotiations as it will spread a 
positive vibe on the implementation of standardized 
technologies. Due to uncertainties and imbalances in 
the enforcement system, the new entrants and/or 
SMEs are suffering and causing serious implications 
for market entry of standardized technologies. In the 
recent times, it is observed that SEP’s generally 
shows a higher degree of litigation, which strengthens 
the need for a precise dispute resolution mechanism in 
a time, bound manner.12 The debate with respect to 
SEPs mainly focuses on the availability of injunctive 
relief. Simultaneously, safeguards are also required 
against the risks, which the technologies users have 
entered with a bonafide intend. However, they are 
scared with a threat of injunction, thus end up 
accepting the licensing terms which are not FRAND 
based. Due to this, the products are faced with long 




As per the various judicial pronouncements, it is 
advisable for SEP licensees to always have complete 
information in order to determine the significance  
of SEP portfolio. It is quite possible that the 
requirements may change from case to case, however, 
parties during negotiations must discuss the FRAND 
terms including its offer and counter-offer along with 
a clear basis about the essentiality for a standard to 
fall under the category of SEP, which may include, 
the proposed royalty, the non-discriminatory element 
of FRAND terms as well as the alleged infringing 
products of SEP users.  
 
Issues in SEP Litigation 
 
Issues in USA  
 
Apple v Motorola  
In October 2010, Apple filed a suit of injunction 
against Motorola for infringement of three patents.14 
Motorola countersued Apple on the ground that its 
various products like i-Phone, i-Pod, etc. infringed six 
of its own patents. Motorola also filed case against 
Apple and sought injunction and damages. The Court 
dismissed the claim of both parties on injunction 
hearing and the parties appealed against this order to 
the Federal Circuit. Federal Circuit held that its prior 
interest was to ensure that no competition policy gets 
violated in order to protect public interest. FTC 
agreed with the view of District Court that it aptly 
applied e-Bay Inc. v Merc Exchange.15 After a 
decade, it has been seen that the ruling on e-bay case 
has not substantially altered the landscape for the 
patent cases, however, it has created some impediments 
in the road to obtain permanent injunctions which can 
be traversed by understanding the trends in the post e-
Bay case law and thereafter.16 
 
Microsoft v Motorola  
Microsoft filed a suit against Motorola claiming 
that it was entitled to FRAND licenses. The Court 
ruled that commitments of Motorola to the IEEE and 
ITU created enforceable contracts between Motorola 
and SSO’s to license its essential patents on FRAND 
terms and Microsoft is a third-party beneficiary of 
these contracts. However, Court denied Motorola’s 
claim for injunctive relief against Microsoft by stating 
that Microsoft’s action cause no irreparable harm to 
Motorola as it has obligations as per FRAND terms to 
comply the same.17 
 
Apple v Motorola (II) 
It is based on the series of counter claims filed by 
Apple against Motorola. Judge Crabb hearing the 
arguments, held that Motorola did not breach contract 
simply by requesting an injunction.18 The Court also 
dismissed Apple’s antitrust claims pursuant to the 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine19 and passed judgment in 
favour of Motorola as there was no per-se prohibition 
against injunction for SEP. Pursuant to this, Apple 
appealed against this decision to Federal Circuit. 









In this case, the Chinese People’s Court after 
hearing the argument of Samsung that the SEPs are 
subject to Huawei’s commitment to license them on 
FRAND terms based on which Chinese Court granted 
injunction. In USA, the Court took due cognizance to 
the date of filing and observed that the litigation was 
filed in the US Court and the Chinese Court at the 
same time but with different time zone. Similarly, 
even if a case is filed in one jurisdiction in US as well 
as in another jurisdiction, i.e. the patent owner tries to 
file a case in his preferred court before the accused 
(infringer) files the case relating to declaratory action 
in another Court or vice-versa. Since the present case 
was filed in US one day before it was filed in Chinese 
Court, the Court entertained the Anti-suit injunction 
and therefore, first to file was given the preference. 
The US District Court issued an order which 
instructed Huawei to enforce an injunction on Chinese 
SEP entered in the Shenzhen Court. The US Court 
also observed that the Chinese Court only considered 
whether the infringer (Samsung) was a willing 
licensee in its negotiations with patent owner. 
However, the US Court considered a much wider 
issue i.e., whether, Huawei has breached its FRAND 
commitment and FRAND terms or not. This clearly 
shows that the US Court will not retry and decide on 
the same issue decided by the Chinese Court and 
therefore, the decision of the Chinese Court will hold 
well whether the patent holder is entitled to injunctive 
relief as granted.21 
 
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. v Inter-Digital Corporation 
In this case, the Court held that Inter-digital had 
violated the Anti-monopoly Law by demanding 
excessive royalty including demand of grant back of 
certain patent rights and initiating action in United 
States ITC, seeking injunctive relief while the parties 
are still at negotiating stage placing the manufacturer 
(Huawei Technologies) at disadvantageous position. 
Considering the entire facts, the Court ordered Inter-
digital to cease its excessive demand of royalty and 
not to link the essential with non-essential patents and 
ordered Huawei to pay damages to the extent of US $ 
3.2 million as damages. Against this decision, Inter-
digital filed an appeal in ITC and District Court in 
United States against Huawei. From this case , one 
finds that the parties challenges the decision of one 
court in another jurisdiction, by twisting the facts in 
their favour and delaying the process of development 
for which a uniformity in law is required as well as 
exclusion of jurisdiction of the defendant, although 
the same should not be taken as a generic rule.22 
 
Issues in Germany 
Germany leads in handling the patent litigation of 
EU, which is substantial23, and it is one of the preferred 
fora of patent litigation due to cost and time 
effectiveness. It follows the split system in which the 
nullity (validity) and infringement proceedings are 
conducted as distinct proceedings and in separate 
courts. This forum provides the advantage to the patent 
owner, as an injunction can be sought against 
infringement in the Trial Court before the Patent Court 
dealing with infringement portion of the dispute 
decides on the validity of patent. Under German Law, 
the patentee has an exclusive right and shall alone be 
authorized to use the patented invention. Generally, it 
has been observed that the German Courts grant 
injunctive relief to the patentee, if there is a risk of 
infringing use of the patent. But German Courts, unlike 
US Courts have no discretion as Germany don’t have 
the situations like e-Bay standards24 and only in 
exceptional cases, the courts have accepted limitations 
in granting injunction. Most of these limitations are 
based on Anti-trust laws, FRAND defense or due to 
misuse of the IP rights by the Plaintiff. 
 
Issues in Japan 
In Japan, like Germany, the courts issue injunction 
as a matter of law. Japanese Court may refuse to grant 
injunctive relief, only if it determines that the patentee 
has abused the patent right. In Japan, the FRAND 
defense was considered for the first time in Samsung 
Electronics v Apple,25 wherein Samsung requested the 
Tokyo District Court on 21 April 2011, to issue a 
preliminary injunction against Apple to enjoin the 
manufacture, import, and sale of certain i-Phones  
and i-Pad. Against this, Apple filed a declaratory 
judgment suit against Samsung with Tokyo District 
Court on 16 September 2011 with a plea that Samsung 
has no right to claim damages due to the infringement 
of its patents with regard to manufacture, sale and 
import of the products as mentioned. Based on the 
arguments of both parties, the District Court refused 
to grant preliminary injunction on the ground that 
these patents are Standard Essential Patent with a 
FRAND commitment, and therefore declared that 
Samsung don’t have a right to claim damages. The 




Court held that Samsung entered into a contract with 
Apple based on FRAND encumbered SEPs, therefore 
Samsung is duty bound to provide the information 
based on the terms and conditions of the licensing 
agreement and should have negotiated the terms in a 
good faith. The Court also pointed out that Samsung 
failed to disclose the information pertaining to the 
royalty calculated in order to enable the Court to 
assess the loss, if at all, Samsung had suffered. The 
Court considered that the approach of Samsung looks 
to be an abuse of its patent right, which was not 
perhaps the intent of granting Patents for the purpose 
of SEP.26 
 
Issues in China 
According to the Huawei Judgement27, the counter 
offer should always contain information pertaining to 
use of standard in the specific product. It has been 
seen that the willingness of the parties to submit to a 
counter offer on FRAND terms is an indication of the 
parties towards more conducive behavior and arrive at 
commonly acceptable terms. It may be pertinent to 
note that there are no deadlines for the counter-offer 
of the licensee nor a generic benchmark which could 
be setup as it has to be case-specific. The counter 
offer may include details regarding various SEPs 
which should also contain information regarding its 
infringement claims. Therefore, while analyzing the 
response for SEP users with FRAND terms, the above 
aspect should not be neglected. 
In Huawei v Samsung28, the Court granted SEP 
injunctions against Samsung, as Samsung was making 
efforts to get judgment from US Court to block  
its enforcement. The Court held that Samsung 
maliciously delayed negotiations and was “at fault” 
during the negotiation. The Court also declared that 
the Huawei patent is a 4G LTE SEP, and Samsung 
infringed Huawei’s SEP. It is a matter of fact that 
Huawei and Samsung negotiated for over six years to 
cross-license each other’s patent portfolios including 
3G and 4G LTE SEP. However, there was deadlock in 
the negotiations and thereafter parties filed legal 
action against each other in China and United States. 
One of the questions before the court was whether, 
the parent company’s FRAND commitment are 
binding on its affiliates; as in this case the defendants 
were Samsung China, Samsung Huizhou and Samsung 
Tianjin but the delay was caused by their parent 
company; Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. The Court 
held that the parent company formed the affiliates for 
its economic interests and gaining economic benefits 
by manufacturing and sale activities in China. The 
Court also pointed out that the parent company 
negotiated the license on its own behalf as well as for 
its affiliates and therefore the act of parent company 
shall be deemed to be the act of its affiliate. In  
this case, Samsung was a beneficiary of Huawei’s 
licensing commitments to ETSI and Samsung acted as 
an implementer.29 
On FRAND Negotiations, the Court found that 
Huawei had met its obligations, but Samsung has not 
after examining the strength of respective SEP 
portfolio and royalty rates offered during negotiations. 
Samsung delayed the process by insisting on 
combining both SEPs & Non-SEP along with no 
timely response to the claim chart provided by 
Huawei. Moreover, there was delay in license offer 
and counteroffer. Samsung even refused to refer the 
dispute to an Arbitrator (three times) and even 
rejected Huawei proposal to submit a comprehensive 
proposal for mediation. All these actions show that 
Huawei has acted with patience, fairly and reasonably 
for having a logical conclusion. Regarding strength of 
SEP of Huawei, the Court found that its license meets 
with FRAND obligations, being consistent with the 
strength of its portfolios.30 The Court, however, 
agreed that both Huawei and Samsung shared a 
similar position of strength in their international 
portfolios, however, Huawei was found stronger 
based on the essential patents adopted as 3G EP 
including the number of 3G and 4G EP declared by 
ETSI. Moreover, the essentiality and technical 
Report31 submitted by the third party also favours 
Huawei. On royalty issue, the Court held that the 
license rate offered by Huawei met FRAND obligations 
and were not found excessively far above the globally 
aggregate rates.5 In view thereof, the Court held that 
the Huawei’s patent is SEP and Samsung was found 
to be infringing the patent. 
 
Issues in India 
The Patents Act, 1970 contains no specific 
provisions related to protection of SEPs. The SEP 
litigation in India started in 2011 when Ericsson 
objected to the act of an Indian company called 
Kingtech Electronics, which imported mobile handsets 
by alleging that these handsets had violated their 
SEPs in Adaptive Multi-Rate Code technology.32 
In India there have been few instances wherein, the 
Competition Commission of India (CCI) acted 
judiciously in order to decide the issues pertaining to 
dominant position and abuse of power. The first case 




on the subject being Aamir Khan Productions Private 
Limited v Union of India,33 which provided the 
framework for the linkage between IP rights and 
Competition Law; wherein the Bombay High Court, 
while rejecting the argument of appellant that CCI has 
no jurisdiction over the conduct of the production 
houses as these production houses were exercising their 
IP rights, decided that the CCI has the power to determine 
its own jurisdiction over matters involving IP rights. 
The Court also highlighted that Section 3(1) do not 
take away the right to sue for infringement of a patent. 
All the defenses which can be raised before the respective 
IP protection boards can also be raised before CCI.34 
This shows the positive approach by the Judiciary to 
facilitate the litigants within the existing framework. 
Later on, in FICCI Multiplex Association of India v 
United Producer/Distributors Forum,5 the standard of 
‘reasonability’ in the context of the Section 3(5) was 
examined by CCI and interpreted reasonability on the 
touchtone of consumer interest. CCI rejected the 
argument that an agreement between producers and 
distributors did not raise competition concerns as it 
was entered into for the protection of their IP rights 
and observed that the producers/distributors had failed 
to produce any evidence to show that their agreement 
was a reasonable condition imposed to protect their  
IP rights. Since the conduct of parties led to distort 
competition and harm the consumer interests, 
therefore it is incumbent upon CCI to protect the 
interest of the consumers by promoting vigorous 
competition, the CCI in the instant case found a 
violation of the Competition Act. 
 
Patent Holdup 
Patent holdup happens when a SEP holder takes 
advantage of a locked-in patent by attempting to 
impose arbitrary rates. Unless, restricted by SSO to 
meet FRAND terms licenses, the SEP holder can 
misuse the locked in position to achieve potentially 
higher royalties. Furthermore, in such situation it is 
observed that, licensor binds the licensee by a non-
disclosure agreement in order to restrain licensees 
from acquiring information regarding the royalty rates 
imposed on previous licenses. Many times, this acts 
as a barrier in the negotiation process between the 




Rationality of a royalty base depends on the correct 
choice of the royalty base. It has been generally 
observed that the SEP holders likely to levy the royalty 
rate on the net sale price of the final product rather than 
on the component which comprises the infringed patent. 
This means that even if SEP is used in a single product 
of a multi-component product, the implementer would 
have to pay the royalty on the component which does 
not include SEP. In such a scenario, concept of FRAND 
terms weakens because at the time of calculating a 
royalty there is a substantial risk that the patentee will be 
incorrectly compensated for those components which 
are not infringing the law as well.35 
 
Royalty Stacking  
Royalty stacking includes overlapping of royalties 
which ultimately results an increase in the royalty 
rate. It mostly happens when more than one SEP 
holders inflicts similar royalties on different components 
of same multi-component product. This issue was also 
raised before the Delhi High Court in the case of 
Micromax and Inte,36 where Micromax was directed 
to pay royalty charges to Ericsson on the basis of net 




Keeping all other factors constant, the party whose 
SEP portfolio contributes less value to the relevant 
standards will have to pay the net-balancing royalty. 
This reflects the values patent portfolios of both the 
parties.38 
 
Availability of Injunctive Relief 
The use of injunction against willing licensees is 
undoubtedly breach of FRAND commitment because 
FRAND royalty rates are itself sufficient remuneration 
to the SEP. This is also considered as an abuse of 
dominant position under the Competition Act, 2002. 
The Indian Competition Law follows the principle of 
equity, being foundation of injunctive relief in India. 
It is, therefore, the duty of the companies to ensure 
that their product should pass the technology standards 
as per FRAND commitments; for safeguarding rights 
of the patent holder. However, in SEP disputes, the 
parties should be given fair chance to present their 
case before the Court.39 
 
Way Forward to have Balanced FRAND Terms  
 
Raising Awareness  
It is duty of the SSO and SEP holders, to raise 
awareness on FRAND licensing process. It also 
requires both parties to negotiate in good faith in a 
time bound manner. It may be pertinent to note that 




there is an immediate need to have model FRAND 
terms to be universally adopted and the national bodies 
should work closely in developing methodologies, 
which shall assist in making dispute resolution more 
efficient and effective.  
 
Approach to SEP 
EU Commission identified three key areas where 
the SEP licensing process should be improved. 
Firstly, opaque information on SEP exposure; 
secondly, unclear valuation of patented technologies 
related to the standards and the definition of FRAND; 
and finally the risk of uncertainty in enforcement of 
SEPs.40 It is well known that the licensing platform 
initiatives in this area are still at an early stage and  
are yet to be adopted by implementers. Therefore,  
it becomes necessary for every nation to understand 
its importance in the area of intellectual property and 
should work towards developing and formulating 
standardized technologies.41 
 
Timely Declaration by SSO and SSO Compliant 
Declarations should contain adequate information 
to analyze exposure of the patent. It is advisable that 
SSOs should provide enough incentives for patent 
holders so that they report case references and the 
final outcome of the decisions. Thus it is important 
that the declared SEPs should be subjected to scrutiny 
of their essentiality by SSO. It is recommended that 
SSOs should introduce an appropriate scrutiny 
mechanism for the same. 
 
Essentiality Checks 
This requires a high scrutiny on essentiality claims 
by a third party who understands technicalities. Such 
requirements to SEPs must be balanced against the 
cost. However, whenever scrutiny takes place on the 
behalf of either patent right holders or prospective 
users, it is important to assess the depth of scrutiny 
and limiting checks to one patent within a family and 
to sample separately in new patent in order to ensure 
the right cost-benefit, balances this measure. 
 
Means of Implementation 
These measures should be carried out progressively, 
and applied to new and key standards say for example 
5G technologies. Firstly, stakeholders should be 
encouraged to understand and appreciate the value of 
transparency. Therefore, the Patent Offices, while 
considering essentiality checks, should work with 
national bodies to ensure effective and proportionate 
solutions so that SEP essentiality assessment can be 
carried out qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Cross-licensing Portfolios of SEP’s 
It is the duty of SSO to develop and promote 
technical standards to permit inter-operability among 
standard-compliant products. Cross-licensing portfolios 
are common these days which enables every party to 
make its standard-compliant products without infringing 
other’s SEPs.42 
 
Steps in Right Direction  
It casts a duty on the governments to ensure that its 
related entities adhere to the accessibility standards 
and should formulate common enforcement procedure 
for the convenience of the public.43 This is to set  
out minimum accessibility requirements for websites  
and mobile apps.44 It will also enable anyone to notify  
a public sector organization if a website or mobile 
application is inaccessible. It must be safeguarded that 
there is satisfactory and effective enforcement procedure 
with a designated authority to monitor and implement 
these new rules. It is likely that this procedure will 
definitely become a good alternative for seeking solution 
through a non-judicial body.45 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the facts lead to the clarity that the 
law on the subject is at nascent stage and the 
judgment on the subject have followed a sinusoidal 
approach and closer to its territorial operation. The 
licensing platform in this area has not been yet 
adopted by the implementer, who is hesitant due to 
uncertainty in the current regulatory environment and 
have little incentive to enter into a deal in this context. 
If the Make in India Concept is to be translated into 
reality, there is a need for SSO to encourage the 
technologist to develop the technology and the 
manufacturer need to ensure that the patentee rights 
are safeguarded and protected. This also requires that 
the patentee should not charge royalty on product 
basis but on technology for that part which belongs to 
them and fall under SEP not the whole. Therefore, 
while negotiating technology based on FRAND 
commitments, it must be ensured that the rights of the 
patent holders are duly safeguarded and protected 
keeping in mind the interest of the ultimate 
beneficiary (consumer) is not compromised. It is true 
that both patentee and manufacturer are at their 
profitability, which is fair enough but both should 
comply with the guidelines fixed by the SSOs 
including the recommendations of EU or other 
International body on SEP (to be established later,  
if any), in order to achieve a fair deal between the 




manufacturer and the patentee and with a neutral role 
of SSO.46 
The development of law on SEP in EU, US, China 
and Japan as seen through the case laws, will act as a 
guiding tool for the Indian legal scholars and the 
technologist mainly on patent applicability on cross 
boarder litigations; such as, the Huawei cases in US 
and Chinese Courts. In order to gain the full benefit to 
the society, a balanced framework of IPR is required, 
which can support a sustainable and efficient standardized 
eco system vis-à-vis the licensing environment.47 
Furthermore, the net benefits in extending the 
current practice and with declarations to ensure that 
SSO to ensure that the database of the government 
department as well as in the private entities are 
available to the public at large, which shall facilitate 
the licensing negotiations in a transparent manner. It 
has also been seen that many courts follow the approach 
adopted by German Courts on SEP infringement; as 
followed in Huawei v ZTE48 and Huawei v Samsung44 
by the Chinese Court and emphasized that a party at 
fault in FRAND negotiations cannot be treated as a 
party with clean hands.49 
From above, one can see that the challenges in the 
area of SEP and the role of stake holders, is to 
minimize the gap for SEP licensing, thereby leading 
to the industrial and economic progress so that 
maximum benefits to SMEs and start-ups reaches to 
the last door. One of the biggest challenges in the SEP 
licensing markets is to monitor with a focus on IOT 
technologies by creating an expert group to take stock 
of progress achieved and assess the need for further 
measures to ensure a balanced framework for smooth, 
efficient and effective licensing regime for SEPs.  
In this regard, the recommendations of the EU 
Commission are vital, which suggest for a Uniform 
Patent Court and monitoring by the EU Commission 
on the market players in the SEP licensing market in 
Europe. It is expected that it shall have a positive 
impact on resolution of disputes pertaining to SEP.  
Therefore, in line with the recommendations of 
European Commission, it is suggested that a Unified 
Global Patent Body to be created at international level 
to set up pools for key standardized technologies by 
facilitating access to pool management including 
techno-legal assistance to SEP’s to provide standard 
setting guidelines for SEPs, which are FRAND based, 
by taking into account the practices and the judicial 
precedents on the subject and suggest the Model 
dispute resolution pertaining to SEP with a dedicated 
negotiation, arbitration and mediation center benefitting 
from a pool of coherent and skilled judges, arbitrators 
and techno-legal experts to curb any malpractice and 
provide necessary recommendations to national bodies 
for its implementation. It should also coordinate with 
the national patent bodies dealing with SEP’s to 
monitor their recommendations for implementation. 
Once these principles are adopted and based on the 
review, necessary amendments can be incorporated on 
FRAND terms by considering the changes in the 
technology and needs of the society.  
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